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framework, absolute income impacts negatively on both completely satised and
dissatised individuals, while relative income a¤ects positively the most satis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ones. Such an e¤ect is asymmetric, impacting more severely on the relatively poor
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income hypothesis as an explanation of the happiness paradox.
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1 Introduction
In recent years a new stream in the economic literature has boomed, which is
mainly focused on explaining happiness determinants. In 1974 Richard Easterlin
moved the rst step towards a new conceptualization of happiness, overcoming the
existing approaches built upon income-based measures of individual well-being.
Indeed, research focused on the relationship existing between material goods and
personal satisfaction- intended as a synonym for happiness- nds that economic
factors a¤ect only 10% of the variation between individualswell-being. Therefore,
the Easterlin Paradoxor Happiness Paradox, i.e. the fact that in developed
countries income is increasing while happiness levels are constant or decreasing, is
a puzzle to unravel by complementing income-based measures of welfare with other
measures, such as health, employment status, marital status and other observable
characteristics of interest (e.g. demographic and sociological factors).
We aim at uncovering the Easterlin Paradox by pursuing an empirical analysis
with British data, based on the intuitive consideration that individualshappiness
depends not only on personal wealth but also on neighbors1 material achievements.
Existing evidence suggests that income matters for happiness if compared to a
benchmark (Easterlin, 1995, 2003; Blanchower and Oswald, 2004a, 2004b; Fire-
baugh and Tach 2000; Clark, Frijters and Shields, 2008). Easterlin (1974) envisages
a consumption behavior in societies: individuals measure their own achievements
in comparison to a general standard of living- the eponymous keeping up with the
Joneses.2 According to this view, given that both objective conditions and social
status symbols vary across countries and regions, even more prosperous countries
may be no happier than poorer ones.
Relative concerns on material circumstances could then constitute an explan-
ation for the Easterlin paradox, as argued by Ferrer-i Carbonell (2005), among
others, and provide a justication for our interest in estimating the e¤ect exerted
by relative income on happiness. The present study drives at contributing to the
empirical literature on the importance of interdependent preferences for individual
1We use the term neighborsfor indicating people included in the individuals reference group,
i.e. people supposed to be confronted with the individual in her daily life.
2The comparison could be made against an internal benchmark, rather than against a social
one, depending on personal beliefs.
2
well-being. Specically, the main contributions of this paper are ascribable to test-
ing the relative income3 hypothesis, and the e¤ect of deprivation relative to mean
income on subjective well-being by using micro-panel data in an ordered probit
framework when the homoskedasticity assumption is relaxed. Indeed, dealing with
subjective data we see t to control for heteroskedasticity due to heterogeneity in
choices. In particular a heteroskedastic pooled panel ordered probit4 (HPPOP,
henceforth) augmented to control for unobserved individual-specic e¤ects is es-
timated and a large number of control variables (i.e. health, both at the subjective
and objective levels, marital status, having children, age, gender, and employment
status) are included. This way exibility in the analysis of marginal probabil-
ity e¤ects is gained, revealing that absolute income impacts negatively on the
probability of being generally unhappy as well as on the probability of being com-
pletely happy. Relative income, instead, has a positive inuence on self-reported
well-being, meaning that comparison income is negatively related to the level of
self-reported satisfaction: in each reference group the (relatively) rich and the (re-
latively) poor are both less satised if the comparison income increases. Such an
e¤ect is asymmetric. In fact, including a deprivation measure,5 we nd that the
mean income impact is severer for the poor, ceteris paribus. Lastly, health, marital
status and employment status are very inuential variables in the regression, thus
representing other important drivers of individual well-being.
The remainder of the present paper is laid out as follows: Section 2 provides
a review of the literature, where we summarize the most signicant contributions
on the explanation of the happiness-income relationship; Section 3 consists of the
econometric analysis; Section 4 is devoted to data description and overviews hypo-
theses and specication; Section 5 is dedicated to the estimation results; Section
6 concludes.
3Intended as the di¤erence between individual income and average income in a specied
comparison group.
4The heteroskedastic ordered probit is also known as heterogeneous choice/ location-scale
ordinal probit. We conied the term heteroskedastic pooled panel ordered probit for synthesizing
the features of the model we use: an ordered probit, pooled, but still allowing more robustness
than cross-sectional analyses (panel), and controlling for potential heteroskedasticity (heteroske-
dastic).
5The deprivation measure consists of a multiplicative term which includes a dummy and
relative income. The dummy takes on the unity when personal income is below the reference
one.
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2 Subjective Well-Being in the Economics Liter-
ature
A proved fact in the happiness-related economics literature is that the satisfaction
of human greed for material goods cannot intuitively represent the sole determinant
of well-being, intended as the disposition to feel good about oneself and ones own
corner of the world(Lykken and Tellegen, 1996). For this reason, the interest of
economists has been captured by other factors supposed to be playing an important
role for individual satisfaction with life, e.g. health, marital status, ethnicity, civic
trust and, lately, the so called relational goods, which are referred to social aspects
of life. Besides, economists are conscious that personal preferences for material
goods are inuenced by personal characteristics as well as by contextual e¤ects
that pertain to the social substrate and the environment individuals live in; hence
similar factors cannot be ignored.
As to the designate variables capable of capturing these concepts, psychologists
started using questionnaires reporting subjective well-being for studying happiness
a long time ago, while it is only recently that economists have started relying
on such assessments. The contributions of Sens capability approach (1995) and
Kahnemans work on objective happiness (1999) have been of crucial importance
in this perspective. Their work juxtaposes to modern economics mainstream,
departing from standard utility theory and welfarism. Indeed, focusing the analysis
on subjective well-being surveys means taking into account preferences directly
expressed by individuals rather than the canonical revealed ones, and takes us
back in time to the earliest conceptions of utility.6 In turn, surveying peoples
life satisfaction constitutes a more direct way of observing their behavior; besides,
it overcomes likely discrepancies between individual wills and individual choices,
6In his Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Bentham (1789) states that
utility refers to pleasure and pain, the sovereign masters that point out what we ought to
do, as well as determine what we shall doand that by utility is meant that property in any
object, whereby it tends to produce benet, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness, (all this in
the present case comes to the same thing) or to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil,
or unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered: if that party be the community in
general, then the happiness of the community: if a particular individual, then the happiness of
that individual.Kahneman et al. (1997) call it experienced utilityas opposed to the modern
decision utility, which is inferred from observed choices and is in turn used to explain choices.
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the latter being possibly not perfectly related to the former because of bounded
rationality.7
In general, surveys consist of questions of the type: How satised (or happy)
are you with your life overall?.8 The range of possible responses is dened over
a scale that varies between datasets (one to four, one to seven, or one to ten), the
lowest grades indicating a poor level of life satisfaction. The result is an ordered
assessment of individualslife satisfaction. As to the interpretation of such answers,
this is classically conducted under the following main hypotheses.
Firstly, life satisfaction is thought of as being a good proxy for welfare, a
more general concept the researchers actually focus on.9 Specically, the former
is assumed to be a monotonic transformation of the latter.
Secondly, life satisfaction is presumed to be ordinally comparable between in-
dividuals. Loosely speaking, we can recognize if any two individuals are better o¤,
worse o¤ or equally well o¤ in terms of welfare. This implies that happiness is a
concept perceived much the same way. Being life satisfaction a monotonic trans-
formation of welfare, we are able to discern happier individuals from less happy
ones.
Lastly, a cardinal comparability of life satisfaction (preferences) between indi-
viduals is assumed to be possible. This means assuming that the di¤erence between
any two consecutive scores in the satisfaction scale is the same regardless of the
rank. Such a hypothesis is not very widespread for its perversity to the standard
microeconomic theory. Indeed, a controversy on happiness (or utility) cardinal
measurability exists in this literature. Ng (1996) argues that such a di¤erence of
7In the analysis of the link between social behavior and rationality in peoples choice, Sen
(1995) suggests similar arguments. He argues that there are many situations in which a choice
cannot be expected to reveal a preference or to be rational, i.e. to obey the Weak Axiom of
Revealed Preferences or alpha/beta properties. The resulting capability-based approach applied
to the study of poverty, for instance, explains why poor people might be limitedly capable of
making some kind of choices or actions.
8A word of caution is in order at this stage. Some criticism might arise about the di¤erence
between happinessand life satisfaction. Indeed, while meaning and comparability are arguable,
some studies have shown that questions on happiness and satisfaction with life are so closely
correlated that reect the same abstract concept (Graham and Pettinato, 2002; Blanchower
and Oswald, 2004a).
9Here, again, it is lapalissian that Kahnemans approach has played a fundamental role, in
that welfare is based on objective happiness. In Kahnemans theory, the construct is objective
happinessand the measure is a temporal integral of moment-based happiness reports.
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opinion arises from the fact that the term utilityis used to measure both indi-
vidual subjective satisfaction (thought of as being cardinally measurable) and the
preference rankings of an individual (where only the orderings or ordinal utility is
relevant). While the latter concept is relevant to the positive theory of consumer
choice under certainty, the former is relevant for many other purposes. Also,
modern economists are trained to regard utility (a measure of the degree of pref-
erence satisfaction) as only ordinally measurable. This is so because ordinal utility
is su¢ cient for the positive analysis of behavior. A given set of indi¤erence curves
will give the same demand curves irrespective of the cardinal utilities assigned as
long as the ordering is the same. Thus, for positive economics, cardinal utility
is unnecessary. However, for problems of public policy or social choice[...] we do
not only need to know how many individuals are made better o¤ and how many
made worse o¤, we also need to know better o¤ and worse o¤ by a lot or by only a
little bit. Thus, cardinal utility is necessary.(Ng, 2008). Ferrer-i Carbonell and
Frijters (2004), instead, produce evidence that the assumption of cardinality of life
satisfaction scores has a negligible impact on empirical results. Indeed, we argue
that such an assumption is closely related to the econometric method used for the
empirical analysis, and that when ordinal discrete models are used, cardinality is
not a major concern.
From a methodological viewpoint, surveys are susceptible to be biased due to
several factors, such as unobservable conditions, situations or events and personal
idiosyncrasies. The econometrician faces the di¢ cult task of controlling for all
these problems at once. The use of panel data, thanks to both the temporal and
cross-sectional dimensions, does permit to control for the aforementioned issues, for
example by including xed e¤ects or ad hoc dummies. Nevertheless, as we will see
hereafter, few are the studies in which econometricians hazard the implementation
of panel data methods in discrete choice models, especially the ordered ones.
As extensively discussed by Ferrer-i Carbonell and Frijters (2004), the econo-
metric models under the hypothesis of ordinal comparability generally present an
ordinal latent-variable specication. The error term may be assumed to be either
Normal or Logistic, this leading respectively to an ordered probit or logit. This
framework is the most popular (for example, ordered probit analyses are pursued,
among others, by Clark and Oswald (1994); Blanchower and Oswald (2001); Frey
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and Stutzer 1999,2000, while Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998); Blanchower
and Oswald (2004b); Alesina et al. (2004), rely on ordered logit models). Usually
xed e¤ects are not directly included in the regression, provided the estimates
obtained are inconsistent (Maddala, 1983).
Noteworthy studies are the ones by Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998),
where a conditional maximum likelihood estimator for a xed e¤ects logit model is
implemented dichotomizing the dependent variable, and by Ferrer-i Carbonell and
Frijters (2004), who augment the Winkelmann and Winkelmann estimator with in-
dividual specic thresholds, disregarding the hypothesis of cardinal comparability
between responses.
In alternative to the frameworks presented so far, other contributions assume a
structural relationship existing between time-invariant variables and time-varying
ones (Mundlak 1978; Chamberlain 1984- general studies) or include individual ran-
dom time-invariant e¤ects in ordered response models (Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2005).
This last strand is the one we take inspiration from.
Relying on the achievements of the literature surveyed, some general guidelines
can be traced for the design of future analyses on the nexus between happiness and
income. In consideration of the ordinal nature of life satisfaction data, we argue
that analyses based on ordered discrete choice models should provide a better t.
In addition, we think that individual xed e¤ects as well as heteroskedasticity in
choices need to be controlled for.
3 The Econometric Analysis
As described in Section 2, numerous are the empirical studies exploring the hap-
piness relationship with income. However, many of them have their pitfalls in the
cross-sectional nature of the analysis, which does not allow to control for individual
specic traits; some others are either specied in such a way too many observations
are dropped or do not take into account xed-e¤ects in ordered response model
settings. The use of panel data as well as the development of suitable micro-
econometric techniques allow us to take a further step towards the achievement of
sounder evidence on the satisfaction link with income.
First of all, we presume that it is appropriate to keep the ordered structure of
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the dependent variable Life Satisfaction, rather than conforming to other panel
data analyses where the same variable is dichotomized, because ordinal variables
embed more information than binary ones. Furthermore, given the strong hetero-
geneity of people surveyed exacerbated by the psychological nature of the question,
the econometric analysis needs to account for unobservable individual e¤ects and
potential heteroskedasticity. Therefore, in the remainder we specify a HPPOP
model, which is augmented to account for unobserved time-invariant individual
e¤ects. We control for unobserved e¤ects which are neither considered as para-
meters to estimate nor as having a certain distribution and being independent
from all covariates, accommodating the model by Mundlak (1978) to our case. In
this way we do control for xed e¤ects, as Mundlak (1978) shows in his original
article, where a modied random coe¢ cients model leads to a withinestimator
identical to the xed e¤ect estimator of the basic specication when unobserved
e¤ects are assumed to be normally distributed conditional on the covariates.
Lastly, we want to avoid the assumption that error variances are the same for
all cases, which might entail biased parameter estimates. Heterogeneous choice
models explicitly specify the determinants of heteroskedasticity in an attempt to
correct for it, which requires the researcher to arbitrarily choose the potential
sources of heterogeneity. This leads to joint estimation of the explanators of het-
erogeneity and the explanators associated with choices.
3.1 Baseline Setting
Hereinafter, we explain the basic pooled panel ordered probit (PPOP, henceforth)
in its standard form. Formally, the ordered categorical outcome for the variable
life satisfaction Snt is coded in a rank preserving manner:
Snt 2 f1; 2; :::; j; :::; Jg
where we implicitly assumed repeated measurements (t = 1; ::::; T ) for a sample
of N individuals (n = 1; :::::; N). The vector of covariates x is, say, of dimension
(1 k). The cumulative probabilities of the outcome are linked to a single index
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of independent variables as follows:
Pr(Snt  jjxnt) = (j   xnt);
where j and  are unknown parameters and  is the standard normal cumulative
density function.
Well-dened probabilities are ensured if j > j 1, J =1 such that (1) =
1 and 0 =  1 such that ( 1) = 0. Ordered response models are expressed
by means of an underlying continuous latent process Snt and a response scheme:
Snt = xnt + nt (1)
Snt = j i¤ j 1 < Snt = xnt + nt < j, j = 1; 2; :::; J ,
where Snt represents the real line that is discretized in J categories by the threshold
parameters j and it is in linear relation with observables and unobservables, the
latter assumed to be distributed as a standard normal, (it). The estimated
parameters are to be interpreted as indicative of the sign but not the magnitude
of the e¤ect. Indeed, conditional probabilities are crucial in this kind of analyses;
they read as follows10:
Pr(S = jjX = x) = (j   x)  (j 1   x):
For identifying the parameters we need to assume that x does not contain a con-
stant, this aimed at xing the location of the arguments in  (Boes and Winkel-
mann, 2006b).
We are interested in understanding how a marginal variation in one covariate
produces a change in the cumulative distribution of the dependent, thus a variation
in all the outcome probabilities. For a continuous regressor xh the marginal e¤ects
are computed as follows:
Mjh(x) =
@ Pr(S = jjX = x)
@xh
= [(j 1   x)  (j   x)] h;
10Henceforth in this subsection we disregard subscripts for expositional neatness; the specic-
ation refers to individual n at period t.
9
where () is the standard normal probability density function. If the regressor
is discrete, we compute the variation in probability before and after the discrete
change:
Pr(S = jjX = x) = Pr(S = jjX = x+xh)  Pr(S = jjX = x).
The size of the e¤ects on the outcome probabilities depends on the values that the
nth observation takes on.
The values at which the partial e¤ects are to be evaluated are the means of the
independent variables. Theoretically, we obtain the so called average marginal
e¤ectsby computing the expected value with respect to the covariates. The way
to consistently estimate the average partial e¤ects is to replace the population
parameters with the estimates obtained by maximum likelihood and compute the
average over the whole sample of observations.
A note is due on the limits of the ordered response models, because the ratio
between the marginal probability e¤ects of two di¤erent continuous regressors
on the same response choice remains constant across individuals. Moreover, due
to the shape of the normal distribution, we observe that the sign of marginal
probability e¤ects changes only once from the lowest to the highest category, being
rst negative and then positive or vice versa. Indeed, it is di¢ cult to understand
the e¤ects for the categories included between the rst and the last.
3.2 Extensions to the Baseline Setting
We operate two main adjustments to our baseline setting by introducing unob-
served individual e¤ects and controlling for potential heteroskedasticity of the
errors.
Specically, when unobserved individual specic e¤ects are assumed to exist,
the specication of the PPOP model changes as follows:
Snt = n + xnt + nt ; (2)
n = 1; :::; N ; t = 1; ::::; T:
In a linear model n would be eliminated by a rst di¤erence estimation or by
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a within- transformation. The ordered probit, instead, given its non-linear form,
does not permit similar methods. Applying a dummy variable approach is not
advisable either, mainly for two reasons: too many degrees of freedom are lost
in this case and the incidental parameters problem11 would lead to inconsistent
estimators.
What we do for taking into account unobserved individual e¤ects is modeling
the conditional distribution of such a term with respect to the covariates:
njxn v N (xn; 2$), where xn is the average over time of xnt, and 2$ is an
unknown parameter. In other terms, n = xn +$n, where $n is an orthogonal
error with $n j xn v N (0; 2$).
In practice, we extend the approach à la Mundlak (1978) to an ordered setting.
Mundlak originally proposes a modied random coe¢ cients model in which unob-
served e¤ects are assumed to be normally distributed conditional on the mean of
the covariates, thus obtaining a withinestimator in the random e¤ects framework.
In Mundlaks specication the error distribution is symmetrical, thus the resulting
GLS estimator is identical to the xed e¤ect estimator of the basic specication.
Therefore it is unbiased (Hsiao, 1986).
The other adjustment regards the error term. We model the error variance
structure, as suggested in the literature on heterogeneous choice models, assuming
that ntjxnt v iiN (0; 2), where 2 = exp(znt#)2. The vector znt can contain all
the variables that the researcher considers as possible sources of heteroskedasticity,
even variables already included in the set of regressors. Such a method should avert
potential heteroskedasticity to bias our results. Heteroskedastic models like this
one have been frequently used to explore heterogenous behaviors (Alvarez and
Brehm, 1997, 1998, 2002; Busch and Reinhardt, 1999; Gabel, 1998; Lee, 2002;
Krutz, 2005). So far, heteroskedastic probit and heteroskedastic ordered probit
models are the most used tools in investigating discrete heterogenous choices. The
advantage of these models is the ability to cure probit with non-homogeneous error
variances or to test hypotheses about heterogenous choices that immediately relate
to 2 (Keele and Park, 2006).
11In xed e¤ects models, the number of parameters increases with the number of individuals,
because we estimate them as unknown parameters. When n becomes large, but T is nite, the
maximum likelihood estimator is inconsistent.
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Back to our model, all parameters are now scaled by
(2 + 
2
$)
 1=2 = (exp(znt#)2 + 2$)
 1=2
that will be denoted with 
nt(z). By assuming that the individual-specic e¤ects
are normally distributed conditional on the individual means of time-varying cov-
ariates, we end up with a sum of normal variables; the response probabilities for
individual n at period t, pj(x; z) = Pr(S = j j X = x;Z = z), look like:
p1(x; z) = 

(1 x   x)
(z)

p2(x; z) = 

(2 x   x)
(z)
  (1 x   x)
(z)
:::
pJ 1(x; z) = 

(J 1 x   x)
(z)
  (J 2x   x)
(z)
pJ(x; z) = 1  

(J x x)
(z)

:
The joint distribution of (Sn1; :::; SnT ) conditional on the explanatory variables
is obtained by integrating $n out in the response probabilities:
f (Sn1; :::; SnT ) =
Z +1
 1
TY
t=1
JY
j=1
pj(x; z)
1(Snt=j) 1
2$


$n
2$

d$n.
The parameters ;;;# and 2$ are estimated by maximum likelihood, the
total partial log-likelihood function reading as:
`(;;;#;2$ j x; z) =
NX
n=1
f (Sn1; :::; SnT ) :
Without further assumptions, a robust variance matrix estimator is needed to
account for serial correlation in the scores across the time periods. Indeed, we
adjust robust standard errors for clustering at the individual level, i.e. correct for
correlation between responses of the same individual across time periods.
As to the marginal partial e¤ects, it is straightforward to see how their mag-
nitude and sign are dependent on the inclusion of a function for modeling the error
variance. The rst case to be considered is that of continuous variables included
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in z when such vector is a subset of x. Consider the marginal e¤ect of xh 2 z  x:
Mjh(x) =
@ Pr(S = jjX = x;Z = z)
@xh
= (3)
= 
h
(j 1 x   x)
(z)
in
h
(z)+h  (j 1 x   x) exp (z#)2z#
o
 
h
(j x   x)
(z)
in
h
(z)+h  (j x   x) exp (z#)2z#
o
;
where the mean component for xh is considered to be negligible. This way it is easy
to understand how the structure imposed to the model allows the marginal e¤ects
to be non-trivial. Di¤erent from the basic model, the ratio of marginal probability
e¤ects of two distinct continuous covariates on the same outcome is not constant
across individuals and the outcome distribution. Moreover, marginal probability
e¤ects may change their sign more than once when moving from the smallest to the
largest outcome. Therefore, while the standard model precludes a exible analysis
of marginal probability e¤ects by design, when turning our attention to the e¤ects
on the full distribution of outcomes this extension appears to be more appropriate.
For a continuous variable xh in x but not in z, the marginal partial e¤ect is
much simpler:
Mjh(x) =
@ Pr(S = jjX = x;Z = z)
@xh
= (4)
=
h
(j 1 x   x)  (j x   x)
i
h  
(z):
Finally, for discrete variables in z the partial e¤ect is easy to compute and similar
to the baseline case:
pj(x; z) =Pr (S = jjX = x+xh; Z = z+xh) Pr (S = jjX = x; Z = z);
while for discrete variables in x but not in z the partial e¤ect is exactly the same
as in the baseline setting.
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4 Data
4.1 The Life Satisfaction Variable
The BHPS is a longitudinal panel survey of households in Great Britain. The
rst wave of data was collected in 1991,12, originally including 5,500 households.
Members of these households who were aged 16 years and over in 1991 have been
interviewed every year, and their children included as respondents when older than
16, as well as any new member of the household. About 10,300 individuals are
interviewed every year from 1996 to 2007 on the general question How satised
are you with life overall?.13 They can choose based on an ordinal scale from 1 to
7, where 1 means not satised at alland 7 completely satised. The dependent
variable is therefore a 1 to 7 ordered response variable denoted as Satisfaction
with Life Overalland is meant to measure subjective well-being. By means of a
single question it is possible to register individualsself-reported level of happiness.
The person surveyed makes a cognitive assessment on her own perceived quality
of life, and we are driven by the belief that these data are signicantly reliable
for disclosing individualsstate. Studies on subjective well-being generally take
two main perspectives referred to the concept they want to capture by means of
the satisfaction variable: hedonism and eudaimonia. Hedonism can be expressed
as the pursuit of satisfaction by self-gratication or pleasure, thus well-being is
merely related to the material goods and the immediate enjoyment of such goods.
Eudaimonia refers to the human desire for overall fulllment- originally eudaimo-
nia ("o, happinessetymologically) was a concept belonging to greek
philosophy14 which considered happiness as the nal goal, the moral perfection of
the human-being achieved by means of the Virtus, and for this reason material cir-
cumstances were conceived to be only corollary to pure happiness. By interpreting
12The number of waves an individual is surveyed may change due to several reasons, such as
death, immigration and attrition or because new individuals become part of the household.
13We drop all the non-full interviews. From Wave 7 (1997) there is oversampling of low income
people for comparability with the European Community Household Panel. Moreover, many more
observations have been sampled for Scotland and Wales. In order to maintain comparability with
previous waves and random sampling, we keep only observations belonging to the original sample.
14Socrates was the rst philosopher using this term; Aristoteles and Plato contributed to
develop the concept in relationship with the moral and political disciplines.
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the meaning of eudaimonia for the present society, we might consider it as the mul-
tidimensional actualization of the self and a commitment to socially-shared goals.
Despite the fact that both are considered separately as inputs into subjective well-
being, for the purposes of this work we focus on the concept of eudaimonia, given
the use of variables other than income in our analysis of well-being determinants.
4.2 Income, Relative Income and Deprivation
Our main interest is to assess the importance exerted by material circumstances
on individual well-being. For this reason, such regressors play a crucial role in the
analysis and deserve a special mention.
The variable income is meant to capture the consumption capacity of the person
surveyed. It is intended as the compound of annual nominal household labour
income and household non-labour income both deated at the UK CPI15 (basis
year: 2005). We opt for household rather than individual income for the simple
reason that life tenor depends on the familiar monetary wealth more than on the
individual one.
Relative income, instead, is computed as the ratio between the real household
income and the average income in the neighborhood.
In the following digression we will explain in which way relative income is
thought of proxying a measure of social comparison and what is the denition of
neighborhood used.
In line with the economic literature on subjective well-being, we assume that
happiness responses give us a perception of individualspreferences. In practice,
we hypothesize that individuals make a cognitive assessment of their overall situ-
ation and express their self-measured level of satisfaction deriving from the utility
function maximization.
Let us consider a function of the form:
Unt = S

nt [(yjt) ; (yjt=y
) ;xnt] ; (5)
n = individual; j =household; t =time.
15Source UK National Statistics (http://www.statistics.gov.uk/hub/index.html)
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where U stands for utility, yjt is real household income and y is a specic bench-
mark income, also called comparison income. Finally, xnt is a vector of covariates-
in our case, demographic and socioeconomic variables.
The term that includes relative income expresses social comparison. Since
Duesenberry (1949), the relative income hypothesis- i.e. that people care about
what their income is compared to other people in the same country more than their
absolute one- has been used in many speculations on individual preferences and
reciprocity. Nevertheless, it is only recently that the happiness economics literat-
ure focuses on the importance of material comparison for individual well-being. In
particular, neighborhood more than country e¤ects are thought of playing a role in
these regards. Neighborhood e¤ects are in general dened as social interactions
that inuence the behavior or socioeconomic outcome of an individual, Dietz
(2002). They include inuences on individual behavior or outcomes due to the
characteristics of an individuals neighbors and neighborhood, and spatial aspects
of the neighborhood (the spatial relationship is dened with respect to location of
residence). However, a measure of social distance may also be appropriate. There-
fore, how choosing the reference (or comparison) group is of crucial importance
for measuring social and economic interdependencies correctly. The main ques-
tion here is whether the size of the neighborhood, as a priori determined by the
researcher, inuences the conclusions of the study. At present, there are no convin-
cing answers to such a question. In our specic case the neighborhood delineation
is driven by limitations of the data set. Specically, we select reference groups
based on sub-region and age-cohort, lacking of theoretically motivated denitions
of neighborhood. If this presents an estimation bias is not known with certainty,
given that no studies in the neighborhood e¤ects literature exist which empirically
test the e¤ect of di¤erent neighborhood denitions. The common sense suggests
that individuals are likely to compare with people they are in contact with in every-
day life, and who share similar characteristics, e.g. are same-aged and live in the
same area. As regards the geographical area, two options were available using the
BHPS: either considering the so called Primary Sampling Units(PSUs) or UK
sub-regions. The former contain, at minimum, 500 households and are stratied
into an ordered listing by region and three socio-demographic variables. The lat-
ter refer to 18 sub-regions. Considering PSUs dened neighborhoods would mean
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having very small groups in most of the cases, as well as too much variability in
the size of the di¤erent groups. That is the reason why we opt for grouping by 18
sub-region, and 6 age-cohorts, singling out 108 neighborhoods. In this last case,
in fact, we increase the size of each neighborhood and minimize its within-region
variability. Furthermore, we assume within neighborhood e¤ects only, i.e. that the
neighborhood has no spillover characteristics. Thus, neighborhoods with identical
characteristics but dissimilar neighboring neighborhoods are considered equival-
ent. In attempting to embed the educational dimension into the neighborhood
choice we encountered a problem of collinearity with the income variable, which is
present in the estimation as well.
Finally, we imagine that income comparisons are not symmetric, a¤ecting the
poor more than the rich. For this reason a deprivation relative to mean income
measure is introduced, leading the empirical function to be conceived as follows16
Snt = n + ln(yjt)1 + ln(yjt=y
)2 +D  ln(yjt=y)3 + xnt
1k 3
k+nt (6)
where
D =
(
1 if yjt  y
0 otherwise
;
and Snt is the conditional expected value of individual well-being. If 2 > 0, an
increase in the comparison income reduces the well-being of those with an income
above the mean. An increase in the reference income produces a worsening in well-
being for individuals with a given income below the mean if 2 + 3 > 0. Finally,
if 3 > 0 the comparison income has a greater e¤ect on the poor.
17 Gravelle and
Sutton (2009) introduce the same measure for studying the relationship between
perceived health and income in the UK. We nd its design appropriate to our
purpose as well, because we want to test for asymmetries in the impact that
relative income might have on the relatively poor and the relatively rich in the
comparison group.
16Notice that equation (6) represents the latent random utility model, as in equation (2).
17A person whose income is 20 000 GBP, and confronts herself with a reference income of 30
000 GBP, experiences the same relative deprivation of an individual having 90 000 GBP per year
and a comparison income of 100 000 GBP.
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4.3 Control Variables
A large number of control variables is included among the regressors for rendering
the analysis more robust.
First of all, we think that health status could strongly drive the happiness
response. In order to capture the impact of the health status on life satisfaction,
we rst make use of a self-reported measure of subjective health. Data were
collected by registering answers to the question How would you dene your health
status over the last 12 monthson a 1-5 scale (from excellent to very poor). We
dichotomize the variable by assigning it value 1 if the original were 1 and 2, and
value 0 otherwise, by relying upon the median point to group responses into good
or bad health status. Criticism may arise on the endogeneity of such variable: an
individual saying she is happy can subjectively consider herself in a good health
status and the other way around. This is why we repeat the analysis by replacing
this measure for health with the variable Limits in Activities of Daily Life (ADL).
This is a dichotomous variable that takes on value 1 if individuals say that a list
of health problems limit their daily activities (doing the housework, climbing the
stairs, getting dressed, walking more than 10 minutes, limits in type or amount
of work) and 0 otherwise. We argue that in this way it is possible to synthesize
individualshealth objectively, by taking into account the possible consequences of
several factors, such as illness, obesity and injuries. Our aim is to check that the
results obtained under a subjective measure of health status are not too dissimilar
from those obtained by including a more objective proxy, which rules out possible
psychological interferences.
Marital status is indicated by the binary variable Married. We include both
legally married and living-as-a-couple individuals, given that we are interested in
the e¤ect of sharing everyday life with someone rather than the importance of
the mere relationship type. Childrenis a dummy indicating the presence of own
children in the household, while Employed is a binary variable that indicates
being in-paid employed.
Age is calculated from the date of birth, and is included in the regression
squared and cubed, in order to control for potential non-linearities in the relation
with happiness.
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Finally, we include gender, ethnicity, year and geographical dummies. In this
case, compared to what we have done for computing the relative income, we group
geographical regions into macro-areas: Southern England, Northern England, Lon-
don, Scotland, and Wales.
Although the BHPS o¤ers a good range of educational variables, only one
suited our purposes, specically a qualitative variable on educational attainment.
Nevertheless, even when properly modied, we faced the problem of collinearity
between this variable and the income one, which makes good sense if we consider
income as a proxy for education. Therefore, we could not explicitly include any
educational variable.
4.4 Potential Sources of Heteroskedasticity
A last note is due on the choice of the variables to be included in the set of potential
heteroskedasticity sources, i.e. the vector z in 2 = exp(znt#)
2. We mentioned that
the vector z can contain either some or all the regressors, or variables which are
not included among the explanatories, or a mixture of both. In our case, we have
selected income, sex, age and ethnicity to appear in the variance structure, this
leading z to be a subset of x.
Income has been chosen for taking into consideration the possibility that an in-
crease in income has a greater impact for poor people than for rich ones. Therefore,
given the high correlation between poverty and low self-reported well-being, we are
driven to think that the variation in income might cause the perceived satisfaction
to vary more for the poor than for the rich. Loosely speaking, a very poor person
who rated herself as completely unsatised and experiences ameliorations in her
income might change her response by one unit, for example. The same variation
might not cause a similar reaction for a rich individual who rated herself as satis-
ed sixon a one-to-seven scale, simply because more income does not matter for
being one score happier. A similar behavior, which is likely to bias our results, is
not controllable otherwise, neither the inclusion of unobservable individual e¤ects
can assure that we properly account for it . Heterogeneity can arise due to several
factors. For example, it may be the by-product of di¤erent levels of perception
about a choice: certainty about if and how much satised one is with her life might
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depend on mental sophistication,18 cultural heirloom, personal ambition. In fact,
age, gender and ethnicity dummies are added for capturing some more variation
in choices, even though we have included them also in the main regression. Again,
the point is to relate heterogeneity in choices, therefore potential error heteroske-
dasticity, with its plausible causes, and we are persuaded that those variables are
indeed good factors for explaining human complexity and heterogeneity.
4.5 Descriptive Statistics
Figure 1 displays the percentage of the responses to the subjective well-being ques-
tion. In accordance with the literature exploring individual well-being in western
countries, about 75% of the people surveyed assert to be very satised (between 5
and 7).
Figure 1 about here
The transition matrix reported in Table 2 gives us a rather clear perception of
how responses change over time. Probabilities located on the main diagonal are
quite high, meaning that choosing the same response is frequent, especially for
very satisedpeople; higher volatility is observed for responses from 1 to 3. A
reasonable interpretation for this is that individuals who consider themselves very
unsatised could nd an improvement in their lives more signicant than already
happyindividuals, as already discussed in the previous subsection.
Table 1 about here
As a preliminary clue on the nature of the relationship between life satisfaction
and real income, let us notice that, according to Figure 2, real average household
income has signicantly increased while life satisfaction has been on average fairly
constant. Not surprisingly, what we nd in our data is adherent to what other
studies on western economies have already found.
Figure 2 about here
18For instance, men and women have di¤erent sensibility and ambitions, as it is well-known.
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Table 3 shows some descriptive statistics. Given that the regressors are mainly
binary variables, we have computed the mean level of life satisfaction and how it
varies when individuals surveyed are women or men, married or not, in good or
bad health status, employed or unemployed, have babies or not, have an income
above/below the average in their neighborhood or in the whole sample. Individuals
with a good perceived health have an average satisfaction 0:61 units higher than the
average of the whole sample; such a di¤erence in the mean may be quite important.
Who lives as a couple has a higher level of average satisfaction, while women and
men in the sample have almost the same average level of life satisfaction. Moreover,
people older than the average are happier than younger respondents.
Average life satisfaction is higher for individuals with a household income
greater than the average, both in the reference group and in the whole sample, and
lower for those lagging behind the others. At this rst attempt, we are inclined to
think that our guess on relative concerns is correct and that other factors rather
than income itself are at work to determine increases in happiness.
Table 2 about here
5 Estimation Results
Tables 3 and 4 display the HPPOP and PPOP estimates, both with and without
individual e¤ects, using respectively a subjective health measure (Health) and a
more objective one (ADL, limits in Activities of Daily Life). The rst question we
address is whether one of the models presented uses the information inherent in
the data optimally. For this purpose, we perform information criteria comparisons
between each model: a smaller value indicates a better t while penalizing for the
escalation of parameters. Akaike, Hannan-Quinn and Schwarz Bayesian criteria
are reported at the bottom of both Table 4 and Table 5. It can be observed that all
these criteria suggest the HPPOP model with individual-specic e¤ects should be
favored to all the others. That is why such a model is considered as the benchmark.
For completeness reasons, though, the other models estimates are included in our
comments.
All our results show that income and relative income are both signicant, but
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they exert an opposite e¤ect on happiness: specically, absolute income is in neg-
ative relationship with happiness, while relative income has a positive link with it.
Therefore, the total e¤ect of absolute income, obtained by summing the coe¢ cients
of absolute and relative income, is almost null. As to the deprivation measure,
when subjective health is considered, it is signicant and positive in sign only in
the benchmark model, i.e. in the HPPOP with unobserved individual e¤ects. In
the objective health estimation, it is instead always signicant and positive. Such
results mirror what conjectured: when the temporal dimension is added, absolute
income matters very little for happiness, because of adaptation and income shock
absorption in the long run. The positive coe¢ cient attached to the relative in-
come variable, instead, signals that an increase in the comparison income reduces
the well-being of those with a household income above the mean. Furthermore,
the sum between the relative income and the deprivation measure coe¢ cients is
positive, meaning that an increase in the reference income produces a worsening
in well-being for individuals with a given income below the mean. Finally, the
deprivation coe¢ cient is positive, thus the comparison income has a greater e¤ect
on the poor than on the rich, relatively to the neighborhood they belong to. We
argue that this explanation could constitute a solution to the Easterlin Paradox
in that the impact of absolute income is compensated from the one of reference
income, leading happiness to depend more on material social comparison than on
household wealth itself. While this idea is not new in the subjective well-being
literature, yet our methodological analysis renders such ndings more reliable.
Not surprisingly, the most relevant variables for subjective well-being are health
and marital status. As to the role played by health status, a good perceived health
positively and substantially a¤ects happiness. Intuitively, limits in ADL have a
negative e¤ect on life satisfaction. The marital status is found to exert a positive
e¤ect on happiness as well, while the number of children has a negative e¤ect on
the whole sample of individuals. Finally, employment status is in positive relation
with happiness, but shows a smaller impact than health and marital status.
The variable age is included squared and cubed in order to determine the nature
of its relation with the dependent variable and to allow for potential non-linear
patterns. Our estimates suggest that age can be related to life satisfaction through
a convex decreasing relationship. It is interesting to mention that several cross-
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sectional or random-e¤ects analyses highlight a U-shaped pattern (e.g. Oswald,
1997; Blanchower and Oswald, 2004a; Lelkes, 2006b). However, the marginal
e¤ect of an additional year in the age distribution is typically small.
Finally, the ethnicity dummies are signicant only for white and black indi-
viduals, essentially because they are the most numerous groups. The magnitude
of the impact on the response probabilities is approximately the same.
Notice how the individual-specic time-invariant e¤ects standard errors are
smaller when the variance is structured as described in the previous sections. This
means that, although the coe¢ cients relative to the z variables are meaningless per
se, still we are able to capture some more error variation and, perhaps, to correct
upward/downward biases. Besides, it is only in the HPPOP with individual e¤ects
that the deprivation measure shows signicance in the main model specication
(with subjective health).
In order to better understand the magnitude of the e¤ect that such variables
exert on life satisfaction, as well as to know how the impact changes across cat-
egories, we now turn our attention to average marginal probability e¤ects of the
income variables on happiness (Tables 5 and 6).
First of all, let us focus on the absolute household income variable in Table
5.19 The interpretation of, for example, rst column MPE5 = 0:0414 is that a
one-percent increase in log-income raises the probability of life satisfaction = 6 by
approximately 0:0414 percentage points. A quite striking result of our benchmark
model (column 1) is that of a negative marginal partial e¤ect for both low happi-
ness responses and the highest one, meaning that an increase in absolute income
actually reduces the probability of being completely satised as well as of being
generally dissatised. Looking at the magnitude of the e¤ects, we can observe
that the negative impact on the individuals who rated themselves as the happiest
is about  4%, while for the low categories the percentage is on average  0:45%.
This would signal that absolute income is not the key variable driving happiness.
Only the individuals who perceive themselves as moderately happy (4 and 5 re-
sponses) show a positive income impact. Performing the same estimation with
no xed e¤ects (column 2) simply leads to an underestimation of the magnitude
for the dissatised individuals and an overestimation of the impact on the highest
19Marginal partial e¤ects computed as in (3)
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categories.
The same behavior cannot be inferred from the PPOP (column 3 and 4), where
the e¤ectssign is allowed to change only once by design. Indeed, the somewhat
perverse result in this model is that the high responses are associated to a negative
sign and the others to a positive one.
On the contrary, the results are unambiguous regarding relative income:20 a
positive variation in this variable due to either an increase in absolute income, or
a decrease in reference income, or both, increases the probability of rating oneself
very happy or completely happy of about 0:9% and decreases the probability of
being dissatised or moderately happy of approximately 2% on average. Such a
result is conrmed for all the models, where accounting for xed e¤ects allows to
avoid, again, overestimation.
Finally, variations in the deprivation variable follow, intuitively, those in rel-
ative income, and have to be interpreted as getting less deprivedincreases the
probability of being very/completely happy , while decreasing the one of being less
happy. Fixed e¤ects are crucial to have signicant results, for both HPPOP and
PPOP.
The results displayed in Table 6 mimic those pertaining Table 5 just commen-
ted, conrming that using a subjective measure of health instead of an objective
one does not spoil the basic variable relationships.
6 Conclusions
In the last 30 years research in economics has experienced a booming in the exciting
eld of happiness and well-being studies. Many are the unsolved questions about
what determines life satisfaction, and economists started focusing on the role of
money in peoples happiness. The well-known Easterlin Paradox, the economics of
happiness milestone, nds that increasing trends in income are associated with at
average levels of life satisfaction in western countries. In a rst instance this signals
that in developed societies money does not necessarily bring the contentment we
might think, thus other factors might be at work. When accounting for other
20Marginal partial e¤ects computed for HPPOP as in (4).
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determinants such as a good health and family status, cultural and civic trust
as well as age and sex, the e¤ect of absolute income may be even negative. At
the light of this evidence, research has recently moved its interest towards the
e¤ect exerted by relative rather than absolute income. Given the phenomenon
of adaptation, individuals are thought of being only temporarily inuenced by
variations in their income, even when highly positive. This might explain why,
despite the signicative increase in income, people rate themselves as being as
happy as always. The relative position in the social ladder, proxied by relative
income, could explain the existence of frustrated achievement or constant self-
reported levels of happiness corresponding to higher incomes.
Our work investigates the role of relative income for satisfaction with life mak-
ing use of frontier econometric methods. Indeed, our primary concern is to perform
an analysis tailored on the data at hand, as robust as possible, and taking into
due consideration the possible problems arising from subjective micro-data on per-
sonal well-being. Furthermore, we try to compute the reference income embedding
two distance dimensions between individuals, namely age-cohort and geographical
sub-region.
Whether the happiness paradox can be explained by the relationship between
relative income and satisfaction is still an open debate. Nevertheless, we argue that
a further step is moved towards the comprehension of peoples psychology and their
perception of what money can buy, based on the conviction that the strategy used
is very appropriate for the treatment of such data. With this purpose in mind,
we implement an heteroskedastic pooled panel ordered probit with quasi-xed
e¤ects, extending the method à la Mundlak (1978) to a non-linear setting where the
homoskedasticity assumption is relaxed. Our analysis is based on the assumption
that self-reported life satisfaction is a valid measure for well-being, and that current
happiness predicts future behavior. In accordance to a number of studies pursued
for other countries, we nd that health, employment and marital status are very
important predictors of well-being. On the one hand, happiness appears to be
decreasing in absolute income, even for people that rate themselves as completely
satised with their life. On the other hand, relative income, i.e. the ratio between
household income and average household income in the neighborhood, seems to
impact positively on the probability of the self-rated happiest categories. The
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relative size of their e¤ects is positive, this meaning that the positive impact of
an increase in ones income with respect to the reference one overcomes the e¤ect
exerted by absolute income. Furthermore, the e¤ect is asymmetric a¤ecting the
poor more than the rich.
Our results lead to conclude that relative income should be accounted for when
exploring what actually a¤ects peoples behavior and their perception of life sat-
isfaction. This could represent a key for the solution of the happiness paradox.
Further analyses could be carried on in the future based on more advanced
micro-econometric and time series techniques, for example allowing household in-
come lags to be embedded into the main regression for understanding whether
habits have a stronger impact than social comparison.
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Appendix. Dataset Features and Statistical Pack-
age
Quoting the o¢ cial BHPS web site The British Household Panel Survey began
in 1991 and is a multi-purpose study whose unique value resides in the fact that:
- it follows the same representative sample of individuals  the panel  over a
period of years;
- it is household-based, interviewing every adult member of sampled households;
- it contains su¢ cient cases for meaningful analysis of certain groups such as the
elderly or lone parent families.
The wave 1 panel consists of some 5,500 households and 10,300 individuals
drawn from 250 areas of Great Britain. FromWave7 (1997), there is oversampling
of low income people for comparability with ECPH. Moreover, many more obser-
vations have been sampled for Scotland and Wales. Additional samples of 1,500
households in each of Scotland and Wales were added to the main sample in Wave9
(1999), and in 2001 a sample of 2,000 households was added in Northern Ireland,
making the panel suitable for UK-wide research.
Data in each wave are organized in di¤erent macro-groups: INDSAMP includes
all sampled individuals (either respondents or not), INDALL is an individual level
record for all members of the household, corresponding to the household grid,
INDRESP includes responding individuals only. The same applies to household-
specic data, collected into HHSSAMP, HHSAMP and HHRESP. Hence, when
extracting the individual interview outcome (IVFIO) from INDSAMP/HHSAMP,
we are taking more observations than those that we have in INDRESP/HHRESP.
They are dropped when dropping according to IVFIO (we drop all the observations
where the interview outcome was not 1, i.e. all the non-full interviews). Also,
in order to maintain comparability with previous waves and random sampling,
we keep only observations belonging to the original sample (MEMORIG=1 for
INDRESP and HHORIG=1 for HHRESP), disregarding the data added from 1997,
1999 and 2001 mentioned before.
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Here follows a list of BHPS codes for the raw variables used in our analysis, in
alphabetical order:
Raw Data
age age from birth biographic continuos
hhyl annual household labor income derived continuous
hhynl annual household non-labor income derived continuous
hgemp In paid employment - household grid self-reported binary
hllte health no indrance daily activities self-reported binary
hlstat health over last 12 months self-reported 1-5 ordered
lfsato satisfaction with life overall self-reported 1-7 ordered
mastat marital status biographic 5 di¤erent stati
nchild number of own children in household biographic continuous
race ethnicity biographic 5 di¤erent races
region region / metropolitan area biographic 18 UK sub-regions
sex gender biographic
By means of STATA, the PPOP model has been estimated using the standard
command oprobit. For the HPPOPmodel, instead, we have made use of a STATA
module by Williams (2006), known as oglm.
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Figure 1: Density of Life Satisfaction Responses
Figure 2: Average Real Household Income and Life
Satisfaction Series
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Transition Matrix
Life Satisfaction in t
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total
1 30.16 14.43 15.52 14.86 12.68 6.56 5.79 100
2 8.40 18.86 25.79 20.97 15.65 7.50 2.82 100
Life Satisfaction in t  1 3 2.81 9.20 25.38 29.39 21.89 9.11 2.21 100
4 1.68 3.17 12.22 32.21 34.12 13.40 3.18 100
5 0.36 1.07 4.58 15.64 46.36 28.19 3.79 100
6 0.24 0.44 1.57 5.89 26.15 54.93 10.78 100
7 0.68 0.43 1.27 3.83 9.81 30.28 53.70 100
Total 1.2 2.05 5.94 13.96 30.57 33.66 12.61 100
Table 1: Transition Matrix for Life Satisfaction, 1996-2007
Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean St.Dev.
Life Satisfaction 91494 5.22 1.25
Household Income 93145 30345.45 22830.35
Age 92870 45.07 18.51
Life Satisfaction if income > average in the neighborhood 38259 5.36 1.12
Life Satisfaction if income < average in the neighborhood 52675 5.13 1.33
Life Satisfaction if income > average in the sample 37462 5.29 1.10
Life Satisfaction if income < average in the sample 54032 5.18 1.35
Life Satisfaction if younger than average 48722 5.17 1.18
Life Satisfaction if older than average 40923 5.30 1.33
Life Satisfaction if good health status 58284 5.45 1.08
Life Satisfaction if bad health status 33163 4.84 1.43
Life Satisfaction if employed 57654 5.24 1.12
Life Satisfaction if unemployed 33840 5.20 1.46
Life Satisfaction if woman 49450 5.22 1.29
Life Satisfaction if man 42040 5.23 1.21
Life Satisfaction if married or living-as-couple 60601 5.31 1.19
Life Satisfaction if divorced, widowed or single 30654 5.05 1.36
Life Satisfaction if have children 26167 5.12 1.20
Life Satisfaction if do not have children 65367 5.26 1.27
Table 2: BHPS Descriptive Statistics, 1996-2007
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Notation in Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6:
 HPPOP= Heteroskedastic Pooled Panel Ordered Probit; PPOP= Pooled
Panel Ordered Probit.
 Dependent Variable LIFE SATISFACTION naturally coded; score 1=very
unsatised, score 7=completely satised.
 hhincomerefers to household labor and non-labor income.
 comparison incomeis determined by age-cohort (16-25, 26-35, 36-45, 46-55,
56-65, 66-75, 75>), and sub-region (Inner London, Outer London, Rest of
South East, South West, East Anglia, East Midlands,West Midlands Con-
urbation,Rest of West Midlands, Greater Manchester, Merseyside, Rest of
North West, South Yorkshire, West Yorkshire, Rest of Yorks & Humberside,
Tyne & Wear, Rest of North, Wales, Scotland).
 Deprivationis Dln(hhincome/comparison income), where
D =
(
1 if hhincome  comp. income
0 otherwise
 *Sigma=exp(znt#):
 AIC= Akaike Information Criterion; HQ= Hannan-Quinn Information Cri-
terion; SC= Schwarz Information Criterion.
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Life Satisfaction in the UK,1996-2007
HPPOP PPOP
Individual E¤ects
Total Std. Deviation
YES
0.3674
NO YES
1.0124
NO
ln(hhincome) -0.0275*** -0.0649*** -0.0681*** -0.190***
(0.00821) (0.0104) (0.0226) (0.0282)
ln(hhincome/comparison income) 0.0157* 0.0916*** 0.0475* 0.278***
(0.00949) (0.0131) (0.0265) (0.0342)
Deprivation 0.0207** -0.00563 0.0416** -0.0404
(0.00806) (0.00946) (0.0208) (0.0267)
Health 0.0973*** 0.222*** 0.274*** 0.651***
(0.00721) (0.0152) (0.00933) (0.0128)
Married 0.0746*** 0.114*** 0.220*** 0.337***
(0.00776) (0.00930) (0.0177) (0.0171)
Children -0.00204 -0.0128** -0.00793 -0.0400**
(0.00518) (0.00545) (0.0150) (0.0160)
Woman 0.0258*** 0.0205*** 0.0667*** 0.0529***
(0.00534) (0.00512) (0.0146) (0.0146)
Employed 0.0176*** 0.0358*** 0.0440*** 0.103***
(0.00583) (0.00618) (0.0164) (0.0164)
Age -0.0389*** -0.0393*** -0.112*** -0.122***
(0.00438) (0.00377) (0.0103) (0.00774)
AgeAge/100 0.0806*** 0.0731*** 0.230*** 0.231***
(0.00887) (0.00762) (0.0204) (0.0166)
AgeAgeAge/1000 -0.00544*** -0.00378*** -0.0155*** -0.0124***
(0.000595) (0.000460) (0.00136) (0.00108)
Ethnicity: White 0.0265*** 0.0237*** 0.0735*** 0.0635***
(0.00694) (0.00666) (0.0192) (0.0188)
Ethnicity: Black 0.0322** 0.0297** 0.0999*** 0.0865**
(0.0129) (0.0127) (0.0365) (0.0364)
Ethnicity: Asian -0.00381 -0.00785 -0.000625 -0.0141
(0.0190) (0.0185) (0.0528) (0.0524)
Ethnicity: Chinese -0.0393 -0.0346 -0.0899 -0.0707
(0.0775) (0.0764) (0.218) (0.213)
Cut Point 1 -2.295*** -1.837*** -6.616*** -5.359***
(0.210) (0.153) (0.438) (0.291)
Cut Point 2 -2.127*** -1.674*** -6.167*** -4.922***
(0.203) (0.145) (0.437) (0.290)
Cut Point 3 -1.921*** -1.477*** -5.602*** -4.372***
(0.194) (0.136) (0.436) (0.289)
Cut Point 4 -1.686*** -1.251*** -4.941*** -3.728***
(0.185) (0.127) (0.436) (0.289)
Cut Point 5 -1.372*** -0.948*** -4.044*** -2.851***
(0.174) (0.116) (0.436) (0.289)
Cut Point 6 -0.977*** -0.563*** -2.934*** -1.757***
(0.163) (0.106) (0.436) (0.290)
ln(sigma*)
ln(hhincome) -0.123***
(0.00598)
Woman 0.0649***
(0.00999)
Age 0.00346***
(0.000278)
White 0.0587***
(0.00905)
Black -0.0101
(0.0274)
Asian 0.0559
(0.0436)
Chinese -0.0469
(0.167)
ln(hhincome) -0.125***
(0.00591)
Woman 0.0674***
(0.00980)
Age 0.00367***
(0.000273)
White 0.0426***
(0.00883)
Black -0.000474
(0.0266)
Asian 0.0470
(0.0423)
Chinese -0.0574
(0.168)
- -
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES
Geographical Dummies YES YES YES YES
Observations 91068 91068 91068 91068
AIC:   2
N
 loglik + 2 k
N
 2.9644 2.9984 2.9900 3.7448
HQ:   2
N
 loglik + 2 k
N
 ln (ln (N)) 2.9662 2.9998 2.9914 3.2658
SC:   2
N
 loglik + k
N
 ln (N) 2.9704 3.0028 2.9950 7.1357
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3: Estimation Results (Subjective Health)
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Life Satisfaction in the UK,1996-2007
HPPOP PPOP
Individual E¤ects
Total Std. Deviation
YES
0.3501
NO YES
1.0716
NO
ln(hhincome) -0.0294*** -0.0418*** -0.0840*** -0.131***
(0.00767) (0.00979) (0.0219) (0.0289)
ln(hhincome/comparison income) 0.0174** 0.0819*** 0.0600** 0.274***
(0.00876) (0.0126) (0.0256) (0.0349)
Deprivation 0.0191*** -0.0150 0.0363* -0.0861***
(0.00741) (0.00925) (0.0201) (0.0272)
ADL -0.0474*** -0.145*** -0.133*** -0.427***
(0.00731) (0.0130) (0.0195) (0.0257)
Married 0.0672*** 0.106*** 0.212*** 0.331***
(0.00710) (0.00893) (0.0171) (0.0177)
Children 0.00159 -0.00640 0.00415 -0.0202
(0.00475) (0.00527) (0.0145) (0.0164)
Woman 0.0162*** 0.0149*** 0.0423*** 0.0400***
(0.00498) (0.00490) (0.0151) (0.0151)
Employed 0.0490*** 0.0568*** 0.151*** 0.180***
(0.00663) (0.00690) (0.0172) (0.0171)
Age -0.0447*** -0.0397*** -0.138*** -0.132***
(0.00446) (0.00377) (0.0101) (0.00798)
AgeAge/100 0.0806*** 0.0733*** 0.246*** 0.249***
(0.00853) (0.00756) (0.0199) (0.0171)
AgeAgeAge/1000 -0.00544*** -0.00380*** -0.0166*** -0.0135***
(0.000573) (0.000454) (0.00133) (0.00111)
Ethnicity: White 0.0235*** 0.0232*** 0.0703*** 0.0648***
(0.00642) (0.00629) (0.0188) (0.0186)
Ethnicity: Black 0.0258** 0.0251** 0.0820** 0.0728**
(0.0120) (0.0118) (0.0362) (0.0360)
Ethnicity: Asian 0.00421 0.00384 0.0291 0.0207
(0.0176) (0.0174) (0.0523) (0.0522)
Ethnicity: Chinese -0.0776 -0.0611 -0.168 -0.130
(0.0769) (0.0739) (0.222) (0.218)
Cut Point 1 -1.899*** -1.701*** -5.801*** -5.288***
(0.193) (0.148) (0.452) (0.299)
Cut Point 2 -1.748*** -1.552*** -5.380*** -4.870***
(0.187) (0.141) (0.452) (0.299)
Cut Point 3 -1.565*** -1.374*** -4.850*** -4.346***
(0.179) (0.133) (0.451) (0.298)
Cut Point 4 -1.356*** -1.169*** -4.231*** -3.732***
(0.172) (0.124) (0.451) (0.298)
Cut Point 5 -1.075*** -0.892*** -3.381*** -2.889***
(0.163) (0.114) (0.451) (0.298)
Cut Point 6 -0.713*** -0.536*** -2.308*** -1.822***
(0.155) (0.104) (0.451) (0.298)
ln(sigma*)
ln(hhincome) -0.131***
(0.00613)
Woman 0.0666***
(0.0102)
Age 0.00396***
(0.000281)
White 0.0485***
(0.00873)
Black 0.00297
(0.0261)
Asian 0.0518
(0.0422)
Chinese 0.000190
(0.184)
ln(hhincome) -0.132***
(0.00607)
Woman 0.0685***
(0.0101)
Age 0.00396***
(0.000279)
White 0.0416***
(0.00860)
Black 0.00158
(0.0259)
Asian 0.0499
(0.0428)
Chinese -0.0250
(0.182)
- -
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES
Geographical Dummies YES YES YES YES
Observations 91108 91108 91108 91108
AIC:   2
N
 loglik + 2 k
N
 3.0458 3.0581 3.0760 3.0886
HQ:   2
N
 loglik + 2 k
N
 ln (ln (N)) 3.0476 3.0595 3.0775 3.0898
SC:   2
N
 loglik + k
N
 ln (N) 3.0517 3.0626 3.0811 3.0924
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4: Estimation Results (Objective Health)
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Marginal Partial E¤ects (Subjective Health)
MODEL
(1) HPPOP with FE (2) HPPOP no FE (3) PPOP with FE (4) PPOP no FE
ln(hhincome) MPEs
1 -0.00388*** -0.00235*** 0.00130*** 0.00417***
2 -0.00474*** -0.00110 0.00225*** 0.00668***
3 -0.00535** 0.00460* 0.00591*** 0.0168***
4 0.00832** 0.0252*** 0.0104*** 0.0284***
5 0.0414*** 0.0524*** 0.00714*** 0.0194***
6 0.00746 -0.0133** -0.0140*** -0.0383***
7 -0.0432*** -0.0655*** -0.0130*** -0.0371***
ln(hhincome/comparison income) MPEs
1 -0.000746* -0.00509*** -0.000906* -0.00612***
2 -0.00147* -0.00930*** -0.00157* -0.00980***
3 -0.00392* -0.0236*** -0.00413* -0.0246***
4 -0.00685* -0.0397*** -0.00726* -0.0417***
5 -0.00468* -0.0269*** -0.00499* -0.0284***
6 0.00923* 0.0534*** 0.00981* 0.0561***
7 0.00843* 0.0512*** 0.00905* 0.0544***
Deprivation MPEs
1 -0.000982*** 0.000313 -0.000794** 0.000887
2 -0.00194*** 0.000571 -0.00138** 0.00142
3 -0.00516*** 0.00145 -0.00361** 0.00356
4 -0.00901*** 0.00244 -0.00636** 0.00605
5 -0.00616*** 0.00165 -0.00437** 0.00412
6 0.0121*** -0.00328 0.00859** -0.00814
7 0.0111*** -0.00315 0.00793** -0.00790
Obs 91068 91068 91068 91068
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5: Average Marginal Partial E¤ects (Subjective Health)
Marginal Partial E¤ects (Objective Health)
MODEL
(1) HPPOP with FE (2) HPPOP no FE (3) PPOP with FE (4) PPOP no FE
ln(hhincome) MPEs
1 -0.00521*** -0.00451*** 0.00223*** 0.00363***
2 -0.00496*** -0.00351*** 0.00321*** 0.00510***
3 -0.00406* -0.000436 0.00754*** 0.0118***
4 0.0109*** 0.0167*** 0.0122*** 0.0188***
5 0.0427*** 0.0465*** 0.00821*** 0.0126***
6 0.00912** 0.00210 -0.0164*** -0.0252***
7 -0.0485*** -0.0568*** -0.0170*** -0.0267***
ln(hhincome/comparison income) MPEs
1 -0.00121** -0.00605*** -0.00159** -0.00760***
2 -0.00201** -0.00977*** -0.00230** -0.0107***
3 -0.00475** -0.0227*** -0.00538** -0.0247***
4 -0.00762** -0.0360*** -0.00869** -0.0393***
5 -0.00512** -0.0241*** -0.00587** -0.0265***
6 0.0102** 0.0483*** 0.0117** 0.0529***
7 0.0105** 0.0504*** 0.0121** 0.0559***
Deprivation MPEs
1 -0.00134*** 0.00110 -0.000964* 0.00239***
2 -0.00221*** 0.00178 -0.00139* 0.00336***
3 -0.00523*** 0.00415 -0.00326* 0.00776***
4 -0.00839*** 0.00657 -0.00526* 0.0124***
5 -0.00564*** 0.00440 -0.00355* 0.00833***
6 0.0112*** -0.00881 0.00708* -0.0166***
7 0.0116*** -0.00920 0.00736* -0.0176***
Obs 91108 91108 91108 91108
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 6: Average Marginal Partial E¤ects (Objective Health)
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